Where a landlord wishes to resist a business tenant’s right to a new lease where the tenancy is protected under the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954, it must establish one of the specific statutory grounds set out in section 30, as outlined in this article by Claire-Elaine Arthurs.
Redevelopment
Landlords wishing to redevelop the property can rely on Ground (f), the intention to demolish or reconstruct. However, they need to be able to produce sufficient evidence at he point of a hearing to persuade a Judge that, on the balance of probabilities, there is a genuine intention to redevelop with realistic prospect of redevelopment taking place.
In Man Limited v Back Inn Time Diner Limited [2023] EWHC 363, the landlord opposed a tenant’s section 26 request on the basis of a proposed multi storey mixed use development, and pointed to its ownership of other property as potential security for funding. The High Court held that a landlord relying on ground (f) must show a realistic prospect of funding, a test the court likened to that applied when assessing the prospects of obtaining planning permission, and found that the landlord’s evidence, produced only at the start of the trial and without clear identification of the security offered, fell short. The opposition failed.
Where a landlord does clear that hurdle, however, the courts have been willing to give the ground practical effect. In Spirit Pub Co (Managed) London Ltd v Pridewell Property Ltd (2025), redevelopment works did not begin until fourteen months after the tenancy ended, a delay the County Court held reasonable given the tenant’s own refusal to grant access for preparatory planning steps, a decision the High Court upheld in 2026, albeit on the basis that section 64 imposes no fixed concept of a reasonable time to commence work, only that work need not start immediately.
A further point worth noting on ground (g) concerns misrepresentation. In McDonalds Restaurant v Shirayama Shokusan [2024] UKHC 1133, a landlord successfully opposed renewal under ground (g) on the stated intention to run a Japanese restaurant, but the venture did not open as planned, closed, and later reopened as a different type of business altogether. Under section 37A of the 1954 Act, where a tenancy has been terminated on the strength of a misrepresentation or concealment of material facts, the court may order the landlord to pay compensation, and it was held that this was such a case, notwithstanding that ground (g) itself does not require the landlord to commit to any particular type of business. If a landlord represents it is going to do something to enable them to rely on ground 9(g), but is later found to have misrepresented that intention, then a landlord can find themselves in trouble.
Landlord’s Intention to Occupy the Premises
Ground (g), a landlord’s intention to occupy the premises for its own business purposes, requires a similar level of settled and clear evidence.
It may be interesting to note that Landlord may, under certain circumstances, go into occupation to run a business similar to that of the tenant. This was considered in MVL Properties (2017) Ltd v The Leadmill Ltd [2025] EWHC 349, where the landlord opposed renewal in order to run the same type of music and entertainment venue as the outgoing tenant.
Relying on Humber Oil Terminal Trustees Ltd v Associated British Ports [2011] L&TR 27, the court confirmed that ground (g) is available even where the landlord intends to carry on an identical business, and accepted the landlord’s estimate that a new venue could open within six months of the court’s order, noting that fitting out work would itself amount to occupation. The tenant’s argument that the loss of its goodwill breached its right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions under Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights failed, since the tenant held only a contingent right to renew. Permission to appeal was refused.
Tenant in Breach
If a tenant has not complied with the terms of the lease either by not paying rent, being late paying rent or breaching other covenants, such as those related to disrepair, then those may present ground for a landlord to object to a new lease being granted.
In Gill v Lees News Limited [2023] EWCA Civ 1178, the landlord opposed renewal of two shop leases on grounds (a), (b) and (c), namely serious disrepair, persistent delay in paying rent, and other breach, and the property had genuinely been in disrepair at the date of the landlord’s section 25 notice, even though the tenant had remedied matters by the time of the hearing.
The Court of Appeal held that, unlike the position under grounds (f) and (g) discussed in Betty’s Café v Phillips Furnishing Stores (1959), these grounds are not to be assessed solely as at the date of the hearing, and breaches throughout the tenancy remain relevant. Even so, the wording of the grounds asks whether the tenant “ought not” to be granted a new lease, and the Court of Appeal held that the tenant’s needs must be weighed alongside the landlord’s, concluding that since the tenant had remedied its conduct, a new lease should be ordered regardless.
Summary
The consistent message from the Courts is that it is key that the right evidence is collated and properly presented. Preparing that evidence early and presenting it in the right way to a tenant can also save considerable time and cost, often leading to agreements being reached without the need for litigation and promoting prospects of costs recovery where litigation proves necessary.
If you want to know more about your position in respect of opposing a commercial lease renewal, please get in touch with Claire-Elaine Arthurs. Getting a clear view of the strength of the grounds involved early, ideally before a section 25 notice or section 26 request are served, is a modest cost against what can otherwise become a much larger one down the line.
